In a moral-hazard environment, I compare the pro…tabilities of a rank-order tournament and independent bonus contracts when a …rm employs two envious workers whose individual performances are not veri…able. Whereas the bonus scheme must then be self-enforcing, the tournament is contractible. Yet the former incentive regime outperforms the latter as long as credibility problems are not too severe. This is due the fact that the tournament requires unequal pay across peers with certainty, thereby imposing large inequity premium costs on the …rm. For a simple example, I show that the more envious the agents are, the larger is the range of interest rates for which the bonus scheme dominates the tournament.
Introduction
Rank-order tournaments are highly competitive incentive schemes based upon relative performance. 1 They are suitable for mitigating moral hazard problems and for the selection of agents under uncertainty about the agents'talents. In the present paper, I focus on the …rst issue. Compared to other incentive schemes, an important advantage of tournaments is their contractibility in situations where an agent's performance is only known to the principal. 2 This is due to the fact that the particular outcome of the tournament has no impact on total wage costs because the principal credibly commits to a …xed prize structure ex ante. 3 However, pitting workers against each other confronts contestants with the certainty of unequal payo¤s between peers. Workers though care for relative payo¤s as suggested by empirical evidence. 4 In particular, they frequently exhibit a distaste for inequitable payo¤ distributions. The prospect of unequal pay then implies additional agency costs for the …rm, the so-called inequity premium. In a tournament, these costs cannot be avoided. 5 By contrast, under individualistic incentive schemes, inequity premium costs are smaller as payo¤ inequity does not always occur but only with some positive probability. If the individual signals about the workers'performance are, however, not contractible, a double-sided moral hazard prob-1 Tournaments have been extensively discussed in the literature since the seminal article by Lazear and Rosen (1981) . See e.g. Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) , Malcomson (1984 Malcomson ( , 1986 , O'Kee¤e, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984) , or Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988) .
2 Third parties, as e.g. a court, are often not able to verify each piece of information that is available to the principal. Moreover, it will often be too costly or even impossible to credibly communicate the agent's contribution to …rm value to an outside party. See e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Holmström and Milgrom (1994) .
3 See e.g. Malcomson (1984 Malcomson ( , 1986 . Other advantages of tournaments include the low measurement costs since relative comparisons are often easier to make than absolute judgements. Moreover, random factors that a¤ect all agents equally are automatically …ltered such that the risk premium can be lowered without a¤ecting incentives. These issues are, however, not considered in the present paper.
4 See e.g. Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) , Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) , and Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1998) . For an overview of the experimental literature on other-regarding preferences see Camerer (2003) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006) . 5 Tournaments may also induce sabotage activities or collusion. Moreover, once intermediate results are known e¤ort incentives are strongly reduced. These problems are, however, not the subject of the present paper. lem arises. Speci…cally, the principal can save wage costs by understating a worker's performance ex post. Workers anticipate the principal's opportunistic behavior and are not willing to work hard. However, given that the contracting parties observe the agent's performance, incentive contracts may yet be sustained in long-term relationships as reputational equilibria. 6 Such agreements are called relational (or implicit) contracts. Since they are not court-enforceable, the incentive contracts must be self-enforcing.
The purpose of this paper is to compare the aforementioned prominent incentive schemes given that performance measures are non-veri…able and Formally, I analyze an in…nitely repeated game between a long-lived …rm and a sequence of two homogeneous short-lived workers. The latter are consigned to work on a similar task which is valuable for the …rm. 7 Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , workers exhibit 'self-centered inequity aversion'. Inequity is speci…ed as inequality, which is suitable provided that agents face symmetrical decision environments. Moreover, I abstract from empathy, which does not a¤ect my qualitative results however. An agent's performance is di¢ cult to measure in the sense that neither is his contribution to …rm value observable nor exists a contractible signal on it. But the contracting parties observe an imperfect non-veri…able continuous signal of each worker's e¤ort. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, the …rm o¤ers the workers either a rank-order tournament or an individual bonus contract.
In the tournament, the agent with the best performance is awarded a winner prize whereas the other receives the smaller loser prize. Under the bonus scheme, an agent obtains a bonus if his performance measure meets or exceeds an ex ante speci…ed standard. In order to guarantee self-enforcement 6 Reputational equilibria may exist if one party cares about her reputation in future relationships. In particular, the parties may prefer to stick to the implicit agreement if there is a credible future punishment threat in case they renege on the agreement. See e.g. Holmström (1981) , Bull (1987 ), or Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994 , 2002 .
7 Typically, workers in such a situation tend to compare their payo¤s with those of their colleagues. For the importance of reference groups, see e.g. Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989). of the bonus contracts, reputation concerns have to restrain the …rm from deviating. Speci…cally, credibility requires the …rm's gains from reneging on the bonus to fall short of the discounted pro…ts from continuing the contract (see e.g. Baker et al. (1994) ).
Given the two incentive regimes, I …rst determine the principal's cost of inducing arbitrary levels of e¤ort. Then I deduce the relative pro…tability of the contracts. I …nd that the bonus scheme outperforms the tournament for a range of su¢ ciently small interest rates. This is due to the fact that the latter incentive contract imposes large inequity premium costs on the …rm by virtue of a high degree of income inequality. In contrast, the bonus contract entails less expected payo¤ inequity rendering it superior as long as credibility problems are not too severe. For su¢ ciently large interest rates, however, credibility requirements restrict the set of implementable e¤ort levels thereby reducing pro…ts. Thus, the …rm switches to the tournament contract once the interest rate is such that pro…ts under both schemes coincide.
Moreover, I investigate the impact of a variation in the agents'inequity aversion on the result. For a simple example, I show the range of interest rates for which the bonus scheme is superior to the tournament to be increasing in the agents' propensity for envy. Intuitively, envy a¤ects both incentive regimes di¤erently. Pro…ts in the tournament clearly decrease as agents become more envious. By contrast, envy has an ambiguous impact on the credibility constraint and, thus, on the resulting pro…ts under the bonus scheme. One the one hand, credibility is favored since envy has an incentivestrengthening e¤ect that allows for lowering the bonus and thus reduces the …rm's incentive to cheat. On the other hand, the inequity premium is increasing in the agents'propensity for envy which lowers continuation pro…ts and, consequently, makes credibility more di¢ cult. Altogether, I …nd that envy bene…ts the dominance of the bonus contract.
Overall, my …ndings underline that empirically observed cultural di¤er-ences in social preferences have non-negligible implications for the optimal design of incentive contracts. In particular, the impact of other-regarding preferences proves to be sensitive to the veri…ability of the underlying performance measures. When agents have fairness concerns, individualistic pay schemes clearly outperform tournaments given that performance is veri…-able. When performance signals are not veri…able, the result is reversed for purely sel…sh agents. For envious agents, however, individual performance pay becomes again superior for a considerable range of interest rates even if performance is not veri…able. This result is strengthened the more envious the agents become.
The present paper brings together important aspects of the literature on tournaments, relational contracts, and that on inequity aversion. In their seminal papers, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983) also compare relative and independent incentive contracts but consider a static environment with purely self-interested agents. The latter authors propose an output function involving a multiplicative common shock. Similarly, I use a multiplicative individual shock in modeling the performance signal. Related to my approach, other papers as e.g. Malcomson (1984 Malcomson ( , 1986 ) emphasize the enforceability advantage of tournaments. The present study o¤ers a complementary, preference-dependent explanation as to why either individual pay schemes or tournaments may be superior in repeated employment settings.
The enforceability of incentive schemes under non-veri…able performance is the subject of the literature on relational contracts. Earlier contributions have focused on environments with symmetric information (e.g. Bull (1987) , MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) , and Levin (2002) ). More recent papers analyze self-enforcing contracts under moral hazard in e¤ort (e.g. Baker et al. (1994 Baker et al. ( , 2002 , Levin (2003), and Schöttner (2008) ). Similar to my work, some papers compare the e¢ ciency of di¤erent incentive regimes for multiple agents (Che and Yoo (2001) , Olsen (2006, 2007) ). I contribute to that strand of literature by additionally introducing fairness concerns among agents.
During the last decade, there is an evolving literature linking standard incentive theory and social preferences. 8 Much of the work is associated with the impact of inequity aversion on individual incentive contracts under veri…able performance. Moreover, as I do, the majority of papers fo-8 Alternative approaches regarding the formalization of other-regarding preferences have been proposed, e.g. by Rabin (1993) , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) . cuses on mutually inequity averse agents (e.g. Demougin, Fluet, and Helm (2006) , Bartling and von Siemens (2007) , and Neilson and Stowe (2008) ). 9 The e¤ects of such preferences on tournaments are analyzed by Demougin and Fluet (2003) , Grund and Sliwka (2005) , and Schöttner (2005) . 10 More closely related to my analysis are those papers that compare the e¢ -ciency of various performance-pay schemes for other-regarding workers (e.g. Bartling (2008) , Rey-Biel (2008) , Goel and Thakor (2006), and Itoh (2004) ). Most closely related to the present paper is the study by Kragl and Schmid (2008) , who …nd that inequity aversion may enhance the pro…tability of individual relational incentive contracts. In that paper, we also brie ‡y discuss rank-order tournaments and give the intuition for a comparison with the individual payment scheme. The basic model of that paper, however, solely encompasses binary performance measures, which does not allow to satisfactorily embed the results into the standard literature on tournaments.
Thus, the present paper complements the former by introducing continuous performance signals and presenting a rigorous analysis of the two incentive schemes in such an environment.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the basic economic framework. Section 3 introduces the rank-order tournament, and Section 4 derives the optimal individual bonus scheme. In Section 5, I compare the pro…tabilities of the two incentive regimes and investigate the impact of a variation in the agents'propensity for envy on the results. Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
The Model
I consider an in…nitely repeated game between a long-lived …rm, hereafter the principal, and a sequence of two homogeneous short-lived workers, hereafter the agents i = 1; 2. 11 In each period, each of the two agents undertakes 9 Englmaier and Wambach (2005) and Dur and Glazer (2008) examine incentive contracts when agents care about inequality relative to the principal. 1 0 More generally, Kräkel (2008) analyzes the role of emotions in tournaments. 1 1 Workers in the sequence are also homogeneous over time.
costly unobservable e¤ort e i 0 that generates some value v (e i ) for the principal. The value function is increasing and concave. An agent's private cost of e¤ort is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function c (e i ) with c (0) = 0. Moreover, c (e i ) is twice di¤erentiable for all e i > 0 and c 0 (0) = 0.
An agent's performance is di¢ cult to measure in the sense that neither his contribution to …rm value v (e i ) can be observed nor exists a veri…able signal on it. The contracting parties observe, however, a noisy non-veri…able performance measure x i for each agent:
where " i is an individual random component. The random components of both agents are independent and identically standard uniformly distributed;
" i iid U (0; 1). In other words, e¤ort is measured in terms of the largest possible realization of the performance measure given the amount of work undertaken by the agent.
The agents observe each other's gross wage i and exhibit inequity aversion concerning the wage payments. 12 For convenience, I consider a simpli…ed version of the preferences introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) .
Speci…cally, I assume that in each period an agent dislikes outcomes where he is worse o¤ than his colleague. Accordingly, in each period agent i's utility of payo¤ i when his co-worker earns j is given by
where 0 denotes his propensity for envy. Thus, the third term captures his disutility derived from disadvantageous inequity. 13 1 2 Note that dropping the assumption of observable wages would not nesessarily resolve the problem of inequity aversion. Agents usually have a belief of a close colleague's income and can moreover infer on wages from observable signals on wealth.
1 3 Abstracting from costs, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose the following utility function: Ui = i maxf j i; 0g maxf i j ; 0g; > > 0: It is worth pointing out that incorporating empathy via the parameter > 0 would not a¤ect my qualitative results. Allowing for status preferences or pride as re ‡ected by < 0 would even strengthen the results. In contrast to my setup and that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , take e¤ort costs into account when investigating inequity aversion; workers compare net payo¤s. As homogeneous workers exert the same e¤ort in equilibrium, an inclusion of e¤ort cost does not a¤ect my results, however.
The sequence of events in each period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the principal o¤ers both agents one of two compensation contracts; either a rank-order tournament or an individual bonus contract.
Second, each agent individually decides whether to accept the contract or reject it in favor of an alternative employment opportunity that provides utility u 0. Third, if the agents accept the contract, they simultaneously choose their respective e¤ort levels. Fourth, contributions to …rm value are realized and the individual performance measures are observed by all contracting parties. Finally, wage payments are made.
The Tournament Contract
In the rank-order tournament, in each period the principal ex ante commits to paying out a …xed sum of wages w + l. The two agents compete for the winner prize w > l. The agent with the higher performance signal wins, and the loser obtains l. Given the continuous distribution of the individual error terms, for positive e¤ort e i > 0, the case of identical signal realizations occurs with zero probability and is, thus, henceforth neglected. Assuming that the loser cannot bribe the principal, the latter cannot manipulate total wage costs ex post by understating performance though signals are not veri…able.
Denoting the prize spread by := w l, agent i's gross payo¤ is given by:
Accordingly, the utility of agent i upon winning is
whereas the corresponding utility if he loses is
Hence, the loser not only receives a lower wage but also su¤ers from being outperformed. Since the probability of equal signal realizations is zero, inequitable payo¤ occurs with certainty, and the tournament automatically leads to an unequal treatment of the agents ex post, even though agents are identical ex ante.
The Winning Probability
For notational convenience, designate the respective e¤ort levels of agent i; j by e; a, and the signal realizations by x; y, respectively. Owing to the structure of the individual performance measures and given the agents'respective e¤ort levels, the signals are independent random variables with support S (e; a) := f(x; y) j (0; 0) (x; y) (e; a)g. The joint signal density obtains:
I denote p (eja) agent i's probability of winning the tournament, given that his co-worker exerts e¤ort a. Thus,
Given the distribution of the error terms, that probability becomes:
To see how the probabilities are derived from the density function consider Figure 1 . The left graph of the …gure represents the case e a. Due to the tournament structure, player i wins only if signal realizations x; y to the right of the 45 -line occur. Given that the joint probability density function is a constant, the probability of winning multiplies 1=ae with the surface of the region where the agent wins; e 2 =2. Altogether, we thus obtain:
The alternative case e a is illustrated by the right graph of the …gure. The surface area to the right of the 45 -line is composed of a 2 =2 and (e a) a. igure 1: Possible realizations of the signals x; y for e a (left …gure) and e a (right …gure).
Multiplying the surface again with the density yields
Altogether, p (eja) is increasing, concave and continuous in e. Moreover, p (eja) is continuously di¤erentiable:
with p 0 (eja = e) = 1= (2a). Figure 2 below depicts both functions.
The Agent' s Problem
Both agents simultaneously decide on their e¤ort choice. I determine the equilibrium e¤ort levels using the Nash-equilibrium concept. In the remainder, a denotes the amount of e¤ort agent j exerts at the Nash-equilibrium.
Agent i's optimization problem is thus given by
Figure 2: Winning-probability p (eja) and marginal winning probability p 0 (eja).
The …rst-order condition yields
The Nash equilibrium of the agents'e¤ort choices is symmetric and unique. 14 Thus, in order to elicit e¤ort a, the principal o¤ers the prize spread
It follows that @ =@ < 0. Alternatively, for a given prize spread, the agents' e¤ort incentives increase in the agents' propensity for envy. This observation is known as the incentive e¤ ect of envy (see e.g. Demougin and Fluet (2003) and Grund and Sliwka (2005) ). 15
The Principal' s Wage Cost
In each period, the principal wishes to minimize her cost for implementing a given level of e¤ort. Denote by C T (a) her average cost of implementing e¤ort a. Solving the game by backward induction, the minimization problem is subject to the agents'incentive-compatibility and participation constraints. Her per-period objective is thus given by
where (PCT) ensures the agents'participation in the contract. Note that, in expectation, each agent wins the tournament with probability 0:5. Since the loser prize l positively enters the principal's cost function, the participation constraint is binding in the optimal tournament contract, leading to zero rent for the agents. Using (ICT) and (PCT) in order to substitute l and in the principal's objective function, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 In a rank-order tournament, the principal's cost for implementing e¤ ort a is given by
For a given e¤ort level a, these wage costs are increasing in the parameter capturing envy. In the literature, these agency costs of inequity aversion are known as inequity premium (see e.g. Grund and Sliwka (2005) ). They are represented by the second term of the principal's cost function (13). The preceding observations lead to the following conclusion.
Proposition 1 In a rank-order tournament, the principal implements …rst-best e¤ ort a when agents are not envious. Once agents are envious, she implements second-best e¤ ort a T < a . Per-period pro…ts as well as implemented e¤ ort levels decrease in the agents' propensity for envy.
Proof. The principal's pro…t maximization problem is given by
The …rst-order condition of the above problem yields:
For = 0, the equation reduces to v 0 (a ) = c 0 (a ) implying …rst-best e¤ort levels. For > 0, by the implicit-function theorem, e¤ort a T is strictly decreasing in . Using the envelope theorem, pro…ts also decrease in .
In comparing the incentive regimes in Section 5, I focus on stationary contracts. That is, I embed the above derived one-period problem into an in…nitely repeated game.
The Bonus Contract
In the individual bonus contract, in each period the principal pays a …xed base wage A with certainty and promises to pay a bonus B whenever an agent's individual performance measure in the respective period meets or exceeds some ex ante …xed standard z. Keeping the foregoing notation, agent i's per-period gross monetary payo¤ is thus given by:
Unlike in the tournament contract, agent i su¤ers from uneven payo¤s only in the case that he does not obtain the bonus whereas his co-worker does.
In particular, the additional loss due to inequity aversion amounts to B.
The Benchmark Case: Veri…able Performance
In this section I initially analyze the benchmark case of veri…able performance signals. As credibility issues do not arise in this case, I only consider the single-period game.
The Agent' s Problem
Given the contract and the underlying distribution function, the probability that agent i gets a bonus, p (ejz) = Pr[x zje], is given by
To see how equation (16) For e¤ort e < z as depicted by e 0 , the agent never obtains the bonus. In contrast, for e¤ort e > z, e.g. e 1 in the …gure, the agents receives the bonus with probability
For any e z, the function p (ejz) is increasing and strictly concave in e¤ort.
Following the same conventions as in the foregoing section, agent i's expected utility is
where a denotes the other agent's e¤ort at the Nash equilibrium. The expected disutility from being outperformed is captured by the last term in the above equation. Rewriting the agent's utility as
we see that the agent will undertake a positive e¤ort e > 0 only if
Otherwise, the worker is better o¤ by choosing e = 0 (see Figure 4) . In the remaining, the above requirement will be referred to as the interior-solution constraint. In the appendix, I verify that in case condition (IntC) is satis…ed at the Nash-equilibrium, the equilibrium is unique and symmetric: 16
In the unique symmetric interior equilibrium, the …rst-order condition yields
The condition again reveals the incentive-strengthening e¤ ect of envy. Intuitively, an increase in has the same e¤ect as raising the bonus. 17
The Principal' s Wage Cost
In this subsection, I analyze the cost minimization problem of the principal if she wants to implement e¤ort a. From the foregoing, the principal solves:
where (IntC) guarantees that the agents are better o¤ undertaking the desired e¤ort level rather than no e¤ort at all. Condition (ICB) is the standard incentive-compatibility constraint, equalizing marginal bene…t and marginal cost of e¤ort, and (PCB) ensures the agents'participation. Just as before (PCB) will be binding at the optimum, which allows to substitute A into the principal's objective function. Rewriting the problem yields:
Lemma 2 Assume that performance measures are veri…able and the principal wishes to implement e¤ ort a. Then solving problem (IV) for the optimal bonus contract B ; z requires that the interior-solution constraint (IntC) is binding.
Proof. Consider the principal's problem as given in (IV) and assume that condition (IntC) is not binding. Substituting B from condition (ICB) yields:
The principal's objective becomes minimizing the inequity premium by the choice of z:
Plugging in the bonus probability as given in equation (16) and simplifying yields:
The …rst-order condition of the above problem is given by
implying
With the second-order condition of problem (PIV) 2 =a > 0, we thus have a minimum. With z + = a, however p (ajz + ) = 0 while c (a) > 0 for any a > 0. This contradicts condition (IntC) as 0 c (a) cannot be satis…ed for any positive value of a. As a result, condition (IntC) must be binding.
To illustrate the intuition of the proof, consider Figure 5 . It depicts the constraints of the principal's minimization problem as given in (IV) for a given level of e¤ort. In the …gure, observe that condition (ICB) implies that reducing the bonus B requires raising the performance standard z. 18 However, B; z must also satisfy the interior-solution constraint. The shaded area depicts combinations B; z for which inequality (IntC) is satis…ed.
Intuitively, if constraint (IntC) were not binding, the principal would want to choose z such that the inequity premium, i.e. the second term of her objective function in problem (IV), becomes zero. This implies z = a as then p (ajz) = 0. However, zero bonus probability violates condition (IntC) as, with a > 0, the agents incur positive costs of e¤ort. As can be seen in the …gure, the solution of the relaxed problem denoted by B + ; z + is thus located outside the shaded area. As a result, condition (IntC) must be binding.
From the foregoing follows that z ; B are implicitly de…ned by the two constraints (ICB) and (IntC): Figure 6 illustrates the solution to the above equation system. In particular, condition (ICB) requires the slope of the two curves to coincide while the (IntC)-constraint stipulates their intersection. As a result, the curves must be tangent. Solving for z ; B , calculating p (ajz ) and p 0 (ajz ) and substituting the solutions in the principal's cost function yields the following result. For an explicit derivation see the appendix.
Lemma 3 Assume that performance measures are veri…able and the principal wishes to implement e¤ ort a. Then the associated cost-minimizing bonus contract is given by Altogether, the principal's cost for implementing e¤ ort a is
Note the incentive e¤ ect; B (a; ) is decreasing in . However, for a given e¤ort level a, overall wage costs are increasing in the parameter capturing envy. 19 With > 0, the principal incurs inequity premium costs because the agents must be compensated for the expected disutility from inequity. 20 The following proposition gives the main results of the foregoing analysis.
Proposition 2 With veri…able performance measures and restricting the analysis to the individual bonus scheme, the principal implements …rst-best e¤ ort a when agents are not envious. Once agents are envious, she implements second-best e¤ ort a B < a . Per-period pro…ts decrease in the agents' propensity for envy.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Comparison with the Tournament
In the one-shot game with veri…able performance, the principal's wage cost for implementing a given e¤ort level, di¤er in both types of contract only in the amount of the inequity premium. Naturally, this results from the characteristics of the two incentive regimes. Comparing the costs of implementing a given e¤ort level as given by equations (13) and (26) 
When
= 0, wage costs are C B (a) = C T (a) = c (a) + u, and the …rm implements the …rst-best solution under either incentive regime. When > 0, however, the …rm must compensate the agents for the expected disutilities implied by the respective pay structures. Intuitively, under the rank-order tournament, inequity occurs with certainty whereas in the bonus contract it arises only with some positive probability. As a result, the latter scheme dominates the former when performance measures are veri…able.
Non-veri…able Performance
The cost-minimizing tournament contract derived in Section 3 is not a¤ected by the non-veri…ability of the performance measures as the …xed sum of prizes is contracible. By contrast, in the individual bonus scheme, the principal may have an incentive to renege on the bonus ex post by understating the agent's performance. Thus, individual bonus contracts are feasible only if the principal is credible to keep her promise regarding the agreed terms of payments. In other words, the contracts must be self-enforcing. Mathematically, this requires introducing a credibility constraint on the side of the principal.
In order to do so, I embed the one-shot model analyzed above into an in…-nitely repeated game between the …rm and an in…nite sequence of workers. 21
Modeling trigger-strategy equilibria, I assume that, if the …rm reneges on 2 1 In particular, I focus on stationary contracts. the bonus once, no agent believes the principal to adhere to the contract in any subsequent period of the game. 22 In particular, for simplicity, I assume that after a single contract breach the …rm is not able to conclude another employment contract. Altogether, the principal's per-period objective thus becomes: max a;B;z B (a; B; z; ; u) = v (a) C B (a; B; z; ; u)
where C B (a; z; B; ; u) is the …rm's wage cost as de…ned in problem (IV).
With r designating the …rm's interest rate, condition (CC) guarantees credibility. The constraint requires it to be worthwhile to stick to the agreement;
i.e. the gains from reneging must fall short of the discounted gains from continuing the contract.
In order to highlight the impact of the credibility constraint on the optimization problem, consider the size of the …rm's interest rate. Given that r is su¢ ciently small, (CC) is not binding, and the principal implements the same contract as under veri…ability, i.e. with > 0 she implements e¤ort a B and the associated bonus payment and performance standard;
B (a B ; ) ; z (a B ). By contrast, for su¢ ciently large r, the foregoing contract is no more credible. In order to reestablish credibility, the principal must thus reduce the bonus payment. The following lemma implies that this requires lowering the implemented e¤ort level.
Lemma 4 Suppose that performance measures are non-veri…able. Assuming that the optimal bonus contract solving problem (V) implements credible e¤ ort a c , the principal uses the bonus B (a c ; ) and the standard z (a c ), where B ; z are de…ned by equations (24) and (25).
Proof. To verify the claim, all we need to show is that condition (IntC) is binding in problem (V) for an arbitrary e¤ort level. To prove this, I
again use Figure 5 from Section 4.1, which depicts the constraints (ICB) and ( Given the above result, the credibility constraint can now be written as rB (a; ) B (a; ; u) :
As discussed above, for su¢ ciently small r, the condition (CC ) is not binding, and the …rm implements e¤ort a B . As r increases, at a particular point, B (a B ; ) is no longer credible, and the …rm needs to lower the induced effort level in order to reduce the bonus payment. In particular, the largest credible e¤ort level is decreasing in r. By concavity of the pro…t function, pro…ts must thus also decrease. Altogether, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume that performance measures are non-veri…able. Then, under the individual bonus scheme, there is an interest rater such that
(i) For any interest rate r r, the principal implements e¤ ort a B and realizes pro…ts B (a B ; ) as under veri…ability.
(ii) For any interest rate r >r, she implements an e¤ ort level a c (r) < a B that just satis…es condition (CC ) for the given interest rate. Pro…ts are strictly smaller than under veri…ability; B (a c (r) ; ) < B (a B ; ).
Comparison of the Incentive Schemes
In section 4.1 I veri…ed that the principal is better o¤ with an individual bonus scheme when performance measures are veri…able and agents are envious. In section 4.2 we saw that the advantage of the bonus scheme is, however, weakened when performance measures are non-veri…able and the …rm runs into credibility problems. This is due to the fact that the choice of e¤ort levels is then restricted by the credibility constraint.
In the present section, I …rst compare the two incentive schemes for nonveri…able performance and a given positive degree of envy. Moreover, I investigate the impact of a variation in the agents'propensity for envy on the relative pro…tability of the two regimes. In order to keep the analysis tractable, in the remaining, I consider a simple example with v (a) = a; c (a) = 0:5a 2 , and u = 0. 23 The results are generalizable, but using the example, however, greatly simpli…es the analysis.
Pro…ts
In each period, the principal wishes to maximize expected per-agent pro…ts.
From the foregoing, for the given example, her objective under the rankorder tournament is given by
whereas under the bonus scheme her problem becomes max a;B B (a; ) = a 1 2 + 3 + a 2 s.t.
(CC ) rB (a; ) B (a; ) ;
(ICB) B (a; ) = 9 2 a 2 3 + :
To shed light on the interest rate's impact on the pro…tability of the individual bonus contract and allow for a comparison with the tournament, I illustrate the credibility constraint as given in (CC ) in Figure 7 . In the …gure, I plot the pro…t functions under both incentive regimes for a given value of envy. Moreover, the convex curves depict rB (a) for di¤erent interest rates, r S > r >r. In the tournament contract, the principal needs not account for a credibility constraint such that she implements a T and realizes pro…ts T (a T )
for any interest rate r. Under the bonus contract, as long as r r, pro…ts are also not a¤ected by the interest rate; the …rm implements a B and realizes pro…t B (a B ) > T (a T ). However, once r >r, the size of r has a negative impact on the …rm's pro…t under the bonus contract. In the …gure, for a given value of r, the realized pro…t and the corresponding credible effort level a c (r) are determined by the intersection of the two curves B (a) and rB (a). Observe that with increasing r, the …rm lowers e¤ort below a B , thereby realizing reduced pro…t B (a c (r)) < B (a B ).
Importantly, the …gure shows that there is a critical interest rate r S for which e¤ort a c r S =: a S is implemented, and pro…t B a S under the bonus scheme corresponds to pro…t T (a T ) under the tournament. 24 Note that it is optimal for the principal to switch to the tournament contract for any interest rate r > r S . The preceding observations directly yield the following result.
Proposition 5 Assume that performance measures are non-veri…able and agents are envious. Then there is an interest rate r S such that
(i) For any interest rate r < r S , the …rm is better o¤ under an individual bonus contract.
(ii) For any interest rate r > r S , the …rm is better o¤ under the rank-order tournament.
Intuitively, pro…t in the tournament su¤ers from large inequity premium costs as inequitable payo¤ distributions cannot be avoided. The individual bonus scheme outperforms the tournament in that respect since expected payo¤ distributions are more even. As a result, the latter incentive regime is more pro…table as long as credibility problems are not too severe. For suf…ciently large interest rates, however, credibly implementable e¤ort levels 2 4 In the present analysis, I assume u = 0. Note that with u > 0, the switching point r S ; a S may become the point where rB (a) is tangent to B (a). Then for any r > r S , individual bonus contracts are no longer feasible. Note that with u > 0, it may be the case that B a S > T (a T ). In that case, the interest rate r S would depend on u. For an analysis of the impact of envy on the interest rate for which bonus contracts become infeasible see Kragl and Schmid (2008). in the bonus contract lead to a pro…t smaller than that under the tournament such that the latter contract becomes superior. Interestingly, at the switching point, implemented e¤ort increases from a S to a T . Thus, under the tournament, agents must work harder albeit the …rm receives the same pro…t as under the bonus contract. Intuitively, the …rm must pay the agents a larger wage in order to compensate them for the increased expected payo¤ inequity under the tournament. The principal is compensated for these higher wage payments by an increased output.
The Impact of Envy on the Relative Pro…tability
In the foregoing subsection, I analyzed the relative pro…tability of the two incentive schemes for a given degree of envy. By equation (28), the parameter capturing envy, however, endogenously determines the interest rate r S for which it is optimal for the …rm to switch from the individual bonus contract to the tournament. In order to explicitly investigate the issue, we solve the principal's optimization programs as given in problems (VI) and (VII). This yields the respective optimal e¤ort levels under the two incentive schemes for given values of and r. Moreover, solving for the switching point r S ; a S as de…ned by equation (28) then implicitly yields r S ( ). This allows to directly analyze the impact of envy on that critical interest rate. As a …rst step, the following lemma gives the solutions to the respective optimization problems.
Lemma 5 Assume that performance is not veri…able and agents are envious. Moreover, suppose v (a) = a; c (a) = 0:5a 2 , and u = 0.
(i) In the rank-order tournament, the principal implements an e¤ ort level
(ii) In the individual bonus scheme, for any r r = 1 3 + 1 3 , the credibility constraint is not binding, and the principal implements an e¤ ort level
(iii) In the individual bonus scheme, for any r >r = 
Proof. See the appendix.
Next, plugging in the e¤ort levels a T ( ) and a c ( ; r) in equation (28), implicitly yields r S ( ). In the appendix, I derive that implicit function and, moreover, verify that @r S =@ > 0: Thus, envy has a positive impact on the critical interest rate for which the …rm switches from the bonus contract to the tournament. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 6 Assume performance is not veri…able and agents are envious. Moreover, suppose v (a) = a; c (a) = 0:5a 2 , and u = 0. Then the more envious the agents are, the larger is the critical interest rate r S ( ) and, consequently, also the range of interest rates for which the individual bonus scheme dominates the rank-order tournament.
Hence, the degree of envy impacts the relative pro…tability of the two considered incentive contracts in favor of the bonus scheme. Intuitively, an increasing propensity for envy a¤ects both incentive regimes to a di¤erent extent. Pro…ts in the tournament clearly decrease. In the individual bonus scheme, however, envy has an ambiguous impact on the credibility constraint and, thus, on pro…ts in the optimum. In section 4.1, we derived two particular implications of envy. Speci…cally, the incentive e¤ect of envy allows for lowering the bonus for a given e¤ort level. As a result, the left-hand side of the credibility constraint is decreasing in the degree of envy which favors credibility. By contrast, due to the inequity premium e¤ect the right-hand side of the constraint is also decreasing in envy, thereby making credibility more di¢ cult. Thus, from the outset, it is not clear, the relative pro…tability of which contract is favored by an increasing propensity for envy. However, my analysis shows that envy clearly bene…ts the relative performance of the individual bonus contract.
Concluding Remarks
In a moral-hazard environment, I compare the pro…tabilities of relative and individual performance pay when a …rm employs two envious workers whose respective performances are not veri…able. My …ndings underline that social preferences play a non-negligible role for the design of incentive schemes. 25 In particular, when agents do not care about relative payo¤s, a rank-order tournament clearly outperforms individual bonus contracts as the former solves the non-veri…ability problem altogether. The present analysis shows that this result is reversed for a considerable range of interest rates once agents are envious.
The paper highlights an interesting trade-o¤. With envious agents, the tournament becomes more costly than the bonus contract in terms of inequity premium costs. Thus, for a range of su¢ ciently small interest rates, the latter incentive contract dominates the former. For su¢ ciently large interest rates, however, credibility requirements restrict the set of implementable e¤ort levels under the bonus scheme thereby reducing pro…ts.
Hence, the …rm switches to the tournament contract at some level of interest rate. Moreover, my analysis suggests that the more envious the agents are the more likely is an individual bonus scheme to be superior. For a simple example, I show that the range of interest rates for which the bonus contract dominates the tournament is increasing in the agents'propensity for envy.
Thus, fairness concerns render the individual pay scheme relatively more pro…table even though it must be self-enforcing.
It is worth brie ‡y discussing some assumptions of my model. First, regarding the shape of the agents'inequity aversion I have solely focused on envy. However, the trade-o¤ concerning the relative performance of the two incentive regimes presented in my paper still carries over to the case that agents are also compassionate as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) .
Speci…cally, inequity premium costs increase under both contracts even further since the agents must not only be compensated for the expected inequity from being outperformed but also for that from being ahead. This makes the tournament even less pro…table and impedes the …rm's credibility under the bonus contract. In addition, empathy counteracts the incentive e¤ect (see e.g. Grund and Sliwka (2005) ). However, as has been found by e.g. Loewenstein et al. (1989) , agents dislike being outperformed to a larger extent than they resent being ahead. Formalizing the notion of compassion by the parameter , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) therefore assume > . As a result, inequity aversion still has an, albeit smaller, overall incentive-strengthening e¤ect. Altogether, credibility in the bonus scheme thus becomes more di¢ -cult to achieve when empathy is additionally introduced which makes that contract relatively less pro…table. However, the …rm still prefers the bonus scheme for small interest rates but switches to the tournament for su¢ ciently large ones.
Secondly, it is worth pointing out that in modeling reputation I have made a restrictive assumption. Speci…cally, I have assumed that the …rm cannot enter another employment contract after once reneging on the individual bonus contract. It is, however, plausible to assume that the …rm can still contract with the agents using a rank-order tournament. Such an assumption indeed a¤ects the …rm's credibility constraint under the bonus contract. Particularly, her loss from reneging on the agreement becomes smaller. However, my results reestablish for this case. Speci…cally, as long as the credibility constraint is not binding, the individual bonus scheme still dominates the tournament as it entails smaller inequity premium costs.
The interest rate for which the constraint becomes binding will, however, be smaller as a positive fallback pro…t decreases the right-hand side of the credibility constraint. Consequently, pro…ts under the bonus contract will start to decrease for smaller interest rates compared to the case analyzed in the present paper. Yet the …rm will switch to the tournament once the interest rate is such that pro…ts under the bonus contract undercut those in the tournament. Indeed, that critical interest rate must then be smaller as well.
Combining both equations implies
Consider the case e a. By equation (11), the marginal probabilities are then given by
Equation (34) thus becomes
Reformulation yields
Note that c 0 (e) e is a monotonically increasing function of e¤ort:
Thus, equation (38) is satis…ed if and only if e = a. Hence, the Nashequilibrium is symmetric. It is also unique as a = arg max e EU i (e; a) :
The proof for the case e a, is conducted equivalently by simply reversing the e¤ort variables e; a.
Proofs for Section 4.1
Proof of symmetry and uniqueness of the Nash-equilibrium. Assume that condition (IntC) is satis…ed. Both agents maximize their expected utility:
The respective …rst-order conditions are given by
Both sides of equation (43) represent a function of an agent's e¤ort level:
The above function is monotonically increasing in e¤ort. To see this, consider the derivative of (44) with respect to e¤ort:
Note that for an interior solution to exist it must hold that a > z. As then ; p (ajz) ; p 0 (ajz) ; c 00 (a) ; c 0 (a) > 0; and p 00 (ajz) < 0, expression (45) is strictly positive. Thus, equation (43) is satis…ed if and only if e = a. Hence, the equilibrium is symmetric. Moreover, as a = arg max e EU i (e; a; z; )
the equilibrium is also unique.
Proof of Lemma 3. The equation system (23) implies
Solving for z yields
By equation (16), the probability of receiving a bonus is then positive:
The marginal probability of receiving a bonus becomes:
Substituting the above results into condition (ICB) yields the incentivecompatible bonus as given in (24):
From the foregoing, the principal's per-worker cost function is
Substituting B (a; z ; ) yields
Plugging in p (ajz ) and p 0 (ajz ), the per-worker costs for implementing e¤ort a become
Rearranging terms yields the expression given in equation (26).
Proof that wage costs are increasing in . Di¤erentiating equation (57) wrt yields a positive expression:
Proof of Proposition 2. The principal's pro…t maximization problem is given by
For notational convenience, denote
= X (a). Then the …rst-order condition of the above problem yields: 
where soc denotes the second-order condition of the agent's maximization problem. Assuming concavity of the utility function, that term must be negative. Given that the denominator is positive, also expression (66) 
The …rst-order condition is given by 0 = 1 2 1 2 + 1 + a T :
Reformulation directly yields a T ( ) as given in equation (29).
(ii) In the bonus scheme, given that (CC ) is not binding, the principal's objective is: 
Calculating B (a B ; ) and B (a B ; ) by plugging in a = a B in the functions given in problem (VII), and then solving equation (76) forr yieldŝ
(iii) In the credibility-constrained bonus scheme, the maximal credibly implementable e¤ort level a c depends on r and is de…ned by:
rB (a c ; ) = B (a c ; )
Plugging in B ( ) and B ( ) as given in problem (VII), the condition becomes: 
The implicit function r S ( ). Given the calculations above, the switching point is implicitly de…ned by: 
Plugging in a c ; r S and a T as given in equations (31) and (29), implicitly de…nes r S ( ). Explicitly solving equation (82) for r S ( ) yields two solutions, the larger (and thus relevant) of which is given by: r S ( ) = 1 9 + 9 3 + 14 + 3 2 + 4 p (3 + ) (1 + 3 )
Di¤erentiating r S with respect to yields a cumbersome but clearly positive expression; i.e. @r S @ > 0:
@r S @ = 6 + 34 + 18 2 + 6 3 + p (3 + ) (1 + 3 ) 11 + 6 + 3 2 9 (1 + ) 2 p (3 + ) (1 + 3 )
